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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Mutual recognition is a remarkable innovation facilitating economic intercourse across 
borders. In the EU's internal goods market it has been helpful in tackling or avoiding the 
remaining obstacles, namely, regulatory barriers between Member States. However, there is a 
curious paradox. Despite the almost universal acclaim of the great merits of mutual 
recognition the principle has, in and by itself, contributed only modestly to the actual 
realisation of free movement in the single market.  It is also surprising that economists have 
not or hardly underpinned their widespread appreciation for the principle by providing 
rigorous analysis which could substantiate the case for mutual recognition for policy makers. 
Business in Europe has shown a sense of disenchantment with the principle because of the 
many costs and uncertainties in its application in actual practice.  
 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to provide the economic and strategic arguments 
for employing mutual recognition much more systematically in the single market for goods 
and services. The strategic and the "welfare" gains are analysed and a detailed exposition 
of the fairly high information , transaction and compliance costs is provided. The information 
costs derive from the fact that mutual recognition remains a distant abstraction for day-to-day 
business life. Understandably, verifying the "equivalence" of objectives of health and safety 
between Member States is perceived as difficult and uncertain. This sentiment is exacerbated 
by the complications of interpreting the equivalence of "effects". In actual practice, these 
abstractions are expected to override clear and specific national product or services rules, 
which local inspectors or traders may find problematic without guidance. The paper 
enumerates several other costs including, inter alia, the absence of sectoral rule books and the 
next-to-prohibitive costs of monitoring of the application of the principle. The basic problems 
in applying mutual recognition in the entire array of services are inspected, showing why the 
principle can only be used in a limited number of services markets and even there it may 
contribute only modestly to genuine free movement and competitive exposure. A special 
section is devoted to a range of practical illustrations of the difficulties business experiences 
when relying on mutual recognition. Finally, the corollary of mutual recognition 
 -  regulatory competition -  is discussed in terms of a cost/benefits analysis compared to what 
is often said to be the alternative , that is "harmonisation" , in EU parlance the "new 
approach" to approximation.  
 
 
The conclusion is that the manifold benefits of mutual recognition for Europe are too 
great to allow the present ambiguities to continue. The Union needs much more pro-active 
approaches to reduce the costs of mutual recognition as well as permanent monitoring 
structures for its application to services (analogous to those already successfully functioning 
in goods markets). Above all, what is required is a "mutual recognition culture" so that the EU 
can better enjoy the fruits of its own regulatory ingenuity. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Mutual recognition is a remarkable innovation facilitating economic intercourse across 
borders.  In the EU's internal goods market   it has been helpful in tackling or avoiding the 
remaining obstacles, namely, regulatory barriers between Member States. Mutual recognition 
(= MR) is widely appreciated for the original and simple fashion it can solve what seemed 
long an intractable and infinite steeple chase of overcoming obstacles for thousands of 
products. It also underlies ingenious ways to facilitate the free movement of services. This 
general appreciation has spread beyond the Union to other continents and the WTO.  The 
notion of MR has travelled beyond disciplines, too, from European law and the domain of 
regulatory specialists to economists world wide.  
 
However, there is a curious paradox. It has turned out to be difficult to get MR 
accepted with all its consequences, despite the almost universal acclaim of its great merits. 
The widespread recognition on its own has neither led to a sweeping liberalisation of the 
internal market, whether in goods or services, nor to much of a deeper analytical economic 
understanding. Not surprisingly, this has frustrated its initial supporters in policy circuits.  
During the mid-nineties the disenchantment with MR was so strong that UNICE (the 
European confederation of industry) recommended a return to harmonisation as a superior 
option. In services it has turned out that MR  is not so easy to apply.  As to analysis,  
economic work on MR is scant. Economic literature on trade or the internal market often 
mentions MR but usually merely in passing or with just a few telling cases (like the German 
beer case) . 
 
This disenchantment and neglect is most regrettable. Mutual recognition opens up 
many and great opportunities. It deserves better recognition in economics and more 
widespread application in Union practices. The purpose of the present paper is to provide the 
economic and strategic arguments for such recognition and application, especially for goods 
and services markets.  In the process I also hope to clarify why MR, simple as it would appear 
to be at first sight, nevertheless entails considerable complications.  These complications can 
lead to high transaction costs and lowering those is a painstaking and involving process. The 
Union is developing this process (as I shall set out) and thereby gradually rendering MR more  
attractive. Indeed, the paper argues for a  " mutual recognition culture", especially at the level 
of national authorities, which would stimulate permanent exposure to healthy competition 
throughout the single market, without in the least sacrificing justified concerns of health, 
safety  and consumer protection. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 defines MR and its place in the 
internal goods market.  The legal and regulatory detail is minimised  so that the essence 
becomes more clear for the economic reader.  Crucial is that MR canno t be understood in 
isolation; it can be indispensable for free movement (liberalisation) and substitutes for or 
complements harmonisation. Section 2 sets out the strategic economic advantages of MR in 
the new regulatory strategy of the Union.  In allowing a much less costly regulatory system to 
emerge, these strategic advantages probably far outweigh the direct economic benefits of 
applying the principle. A micro-economic analysis of the direct (welfare) benefits is provided 
in section 3, showing its pro-competitive nature unless strategic games are played on quality.  
Section 4 deals with the drawbacks of MR. It is little known or understood that the proper 
application of MR implies large and "deep rooted " transactions costs. These costs are spelled 
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out in some detail and illustrated. Section 5 discusses MR in services. MR or the related ' 
home country control ' principle has clearly yielded strategic as well as direct benefits in some 
service sectors like transport and financial services. Yet in other sectors the gains are spurious 
or MR is largely irrelevant. 
The discussion then turns to regulatory competition and its (de)merits. The case for regulatory 
competition is conditional and indeed more problematic than MR, its prerequisite. Casual 
empiricism suggests that it is not widely practiced in Europe despite many fears. This brings 
us to the ambivalent attitude of European business to MR which is explored in section 7. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
 
1. Mutual Recognition in the internal goods market  
 
 
            After decades of experience with “deep “ market integration in Europe the concept and 
place of mutual recognition can be clearly defined. There are basically three ways of realizing 
free movement (here, of goods) in the internal market:  liberalisation, approximation and 
mutual recognition. All three have limitations and no single method can suffice for all cases. 
In that sense they are complements. Liberalisation amounts to the imposition of free 
movement by prohibitions for Member States to intervene in cross-border trade in direct or 
even indirect ways. These prohibitions derive either straight from the Treaty and the European 
Court of Justice (= ECJ)  jurisprudence or from EC regulations or directives building on such 
provisions. Approximation is the adaptation of national laws in such a way and to such a 
degree that cross-border trade is no longer hindered in a direct or indirect way. This 
approximation avoids, therefore, centralized rules but aims to bring national laws into 
“harmony “  (hence, the French wording “harmonisation” in art.s 94 and 95, EC where the 
English text speaks of “approximation “). Approximation can be justified as a complement to 
liberalisation where market failures have to be overcome by regulation. In extreme cases of 
very high risk where uncertainty or discretion could have unacceptable consequences such 
market failures might be addressed by centralized rules but otherwise, hence in the 
overwhelming majority of regulatory issues, approximation will suffice. The goal must then 
be commonly defined  (because the purpose of directives is to remove or overcome the market 
failure throughout the EU) and the instruments  (that is, the detailed technical provisions) only 
insofar as they might hinder, directly or indirectly, intra-EC trade. 
Mutual recognition starts from the idea that Member States have equivalent regulatory 
objectives in safety, health, environment and consumer protection (= SHEC) which, in actual 
practice in Europe, is very often correct. But if and when objectives are equivalent   and thus 
the market failure is addressed, approximation should no longer be necessary and free 
movement could prevail. The notion of mutual recognition refers to the implication for 
national customs or inspectors or regulatory agencies or policy makers that a good entering 
this Member State from another EU country must be allowed unhindered access, even if the 
detailed specifications in the relevant domestic regulation differ from those in the country of 
origin, as long as the regulatory objectives are equivalent: from a narrow regulatory point of 
view it would thus seem as if the importing country “recognizes” the regulatory regime of the 
exporting country. Because the principle has general application for the internal market, this 
“recognition “ is  “mutual “.  
 
Before explaining MR a little more precisely in the EU context, it is crucial to 
appreciate a few properties. First, mutual recognition must always be understood as an 
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alternative or complement to liberalisation and/or approximation. Therefore, when EU 
authorities say that MR is a leading principle of the internal market  this should not be 
interpreted   -  as some  ill- informed economists have done  -  as meaning that it is the sole or 
overriding principle. Economists ought to analyse the economics of MR in the proper 
regulatory context. Second, the reliance on MR in the EU is greatly facilitated by the forceful 
treaty principle of free movement, a principle that does not exist and cannot be expected in 
international trade law or in economic regionalism elsewhere (whether NAFTA, the ASEAN 
free trade area, Mercosur , etc.). Free movement goes much beyond free trade in that the 
former implies a right to enter national markets. National discretion to intervene only exists 
when there is an explicit derogation in the treaty. Thus, when the derogation does not apply or 
when it is narrowly interpreted by the ECJ  (which has typically happened in the EU) free 
movement prevails automatically. And when derogations do apply, the objectives and key 
aspects can be approximated by common decision-making. The originality of  “mutual 
recognition “ was that, before rushing into thousands of approximation exercises, one should 
first ask the question whether the objectives of national regulation, falling under the  
derogation, are not equivalent to begin with. If so MR applies because the purpose  (i.e. 
overcoming the internal market failure) is then fulfilled and free movement should prevail, 
irrespective of the details that might differ between those national rules. Third, a supranational 
ECJ is neither present in the WTO  regime nor in other regional trade regimes. It is the 
combination of these last two aspects (i.e. the principle of free movement rather than free 
trade, and a “supreme “ court) which makes it doubtful whether MR, with all its profound 
consequences, can be exported to world trade or other trade blocs.(see also Pelkmans, 1995). 
 
       The remainder of this section endeavours to set out more precisely the mutual 
recognition regime of the Union in its regulatory context. The aim is to have the reader 
understand that MR can only flourish in a well-defined and hierarchical legal regime. As 
section 4 will show. even this is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for a smooth 
application in the internal market, genuinely lowering transaction costs of intra-EU economic 
intercourse.  
 
 The principle of mutual recognition has been developed by the ECJ in its case- law. In 
its famous Cassis de Dijon case, the ECJ held that, in principle, a Member State must allow a 
product lawfully produced and marketed in another Member State into its own market, unless 
a prohibition of this product is justified by mandatory requirements, such as health and safety 
protection (see below).1 This means that Member States cannot apply certain specific details 
of national regulation to intra-EC imports of goods, if the objective or effect of the relevant 
law in other Member States is equivalent to that of the importing country. The idea behind 
mutual recognition is that all Member States care for their citizens and cannot be assumed to 
produce for instance unsafe or unhealthy products, merely because technical specifications 
differ. Hence the principle of mutual recognition plays a pivotal role in the internal market 
since it ensures free movement of goods (and services) without making it necessary to 
approximate/harmonise national legislation. Since free movement of goods is essential to the 
internal market, it is not surprising that the burden of proof of ‘non-equivalence’ of objectives 
is on the Member State which is unwilling to allow the import of the products concerned. 
Where the regulatory objective or effect are not equivalent, free movement can be impeded. 
In such cases, however, the Treaty offers a remedy to the free movement by allowing for the 
approximation of  precisely those objectives or effects under Article 95 EC (ex Article  100a 
EC), under qualified majority voting. 
                                                 
1 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, although this 
principle was only explicitly developed in Case 113/80, Commission v Ireland [1981] ECR 1625. 
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Table 1. Interaction Between Liberalisation, Mutual Recognition and Approximation  
 
 Article Nature Main features 
1. 28 EC 
(ex 30 EC) 
LIBERALISATION Prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports or 
measures having an equivalent effect 
(regulatory barriers) 
 
  Extended: 
(ground work for  
mutual recognition) 
Ø Dassonville Ruling of 1974: widening of prohibition to 
all regulatory barriers: 
‘[a]ll trading rules enacted by Member States which 
are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, 
actually or potentially, intra -Community trade are to 
be considered as measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions’ 
Ø Enhances liberalisation 
 
2. 28 EC 
(ex 30 EC) 
MUTUAL  
RECOGNITION 
Ø Cassis de Dijon Ruling of 1979: further refinement of 
the principle of equivalence:  
Member States must allow a product lawfully 
produced and marketed in another Member State into 
their own market, unless a prohibition of this product 
is justified by mandatory requirements (see point 3) 
Ø if regulatory objectives or effects such as Safety, 
Health, Environment and Consumer protection (SHEC) 
are equivalent Member States must mutually recognise 
each other’s legislation 
Ø obligation to include a mutual recognition clause in 
national legislation (Foie Gras Ruling and Dir. 98/34) 
Ø if not equivalent, then approximate (see point 4, below) 
Ø enhances liberalisation even more 
 
3. 30 EC 
(ex 36 EC) 
 
and  
 
28 EC  
(ex 30 EC) 
DEROGATIONS to 
liberalisation  
 
and  
 
mutual recognition 
 
Ø all grounds in mentioned in Article 30 EC, which are 
restrictively interpreted  
 
and  
 
Ø other ‘mandatory requirements’ developed in the ECJ’s 
case-law, notably the Cassis de Dijon Ruling (‘rule of 
reason’) 
Ø all derogations are subject to a proportionality test 
 
4. 95 EC 
(ex 100a EC) 
APPROXIMATION 
 
‘New Approach’ 
(broad and/or horizontal) 
Ø where national (SHEC) objectives are not equivalent, 
approximation unifies those objectives  
Ø wide sectors covered (e.g. machines) 
Ø or horizontal issues covered (e.g. directives on food 
additives or general product safety) 
 
5. 95 EC 
(ex 100a EC) 
only if not 
applicable: 
94 EC  
(ex 100 EC)  
APPROXIMATION 
 
‘Old Approach’ 
(specific and/or vertical) 
Ø all other (product) approximation: for instance:  
· involving high risk (chemicals, cars) 
· precision in rules required (measuring instruments) 
· specifying certain product compositions, such as jam 
and marmalade and cocoa and chocolate) 
source:  Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro (2000)
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In order to grasp fully the role and significance of mutual recognition one needs to 
understand how liberalisation, mutual recognition and approximation work together to ensure 
free movement. This interrelationship is summarised in Table 1. Article 28 EC gives 
expression to the general principle of free movement of goods by prohibiting the Member 
States from imposing quantitative restrictions on imports or measures having an equivalent 
effect. The treaty language is a misnomer, probably drafted by trade diplomats.  The phrase 
should be: 'regulatory barriers', as the Court acknowledged in Dassonville (1974).  In 
Dassonville, the ECJ removed all uncertainties about the interpretation of the concept of 
‘measures having equivalent effect’ by declaring that also trading rules enacted by Member 
States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative  
restrictions.2 This economic interpretation paved the way for a very broad interpretation of 
measures of equivalent effect.3 In its famous Cassis de Dijon ruling, the ECJ further refined 
the principle of equivalence and ruled that products lawfully produced and marketed in one 
Member State must be admitted by another Member State, save where refusal is justified by 
virtue of mandatory requirements.4   In its 1985 White Paper on the Completion of the Internal 
Market the Commission adopted the principle of mutual recognition as its main strategy to 
achieve the internal market, with far-reaching consequences 5.  In addition, it proclaimed its 
intention to concentrate its approximation activities mainly in areas where trade barriers were 
justified according to the criteria determined by the Court.  
 
 The principle of mutual recognition thus implies that Member States, when drawing 
up commercial or technical rules liable to affect the free movement of goods, may not take an 
exclusively national viewpoint and take account only of requirements confined to domestic 
products. In this way, the mutual recognition case-law boils down to regulatory reform 
because exposure to competition from elsewhere in the Union is enhanced, without 
compromising the purpose of regulation, namely, overcoming the SHEC-type market failures. 
According to the ECJ’s case- law, Member States are moreover required to include in their 
national legislation a so-called mutual recognition clause, in order to allow the acceptance on 
their territory products which are in conformity with the legislation of another Member State.6 
This requirement stems from the implementation of the notification procedure laid down in 
the Information Directive (Directive 98/34/EC) (see below). 
In emphasising the objective(s), rather than the detailed specifications, in a national 
product law or decree, the national regulation as well as the regulation of Member States 
where the imported product comes from are forced to concentrate on overcoming the market 
failure. This will tend to make regulatory failure unattractive. A widespread instance of 
regulatory failure in Europe was overregulation  in the sense that  national product laws would 
extend to aspects that had nothing to do with the market failure. At the same time however, it 
assumes that the grounds in Article 30 EC (ex Article 36 EC, referring mainly to health and 
safety) represent market failures. If one includes the so-called ‘rule of reason’ interpretation 
of the ECJ of Article 28 EC (ex Article 30 EC) which justifies national regulation involving 
environment and consumer protection, and observes that almost all the relevant product 
                                                 
2 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.  
3. See, more recently, for instance, Cases C-238/89, Pall-Dahlhausen [1990] ECR I-4827; C-362/88, GB-INNO-
BM v Confédération du Commerce Luxembourgeois [1990] ECR I-667, C-126/91, Schutzverband gegen 
Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v Yves Rocher [1993] ECR I-2361See however the ECJ’s more restrictive approach 
in Court’s Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard  [1993] ECR I-6126. 
4 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
5 White Paper, Completing the Internal Market, 13 June 1985 (COM (85)314). 
6 See Case C-184/96 Commission v France (Foie Gras)  [1998] ECR I-6197. 
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regulation, related to Article 30 EC (ex Article 36 EC) is about health and safety protection, 
this assumption is broadly correct. Those four combine to SHEC which covers practically all 
relevant market failures for goods.  
 
Where mutual recognition fails because of non-equivalence the EU can decide to take 
up regulation approximating national legislative provisions in order to ensure the free 
movement of goods. In an attempt to overcome the drawbacks of the ‘old approach’ to the 
abolition of technical barriers to trade followed by the Council since 1969,7 the Commission 
launched in 1985 its ‘New Approach to Harmonisation and Technical Standards’.The new 
approach restricts approximation to stipulating essential health and safety requirements, 
whilst the specification of these requirements in technical standards is left to the European 
standardisation bodies (CEN, CENELEC and ETSI). The distinction between the essential 
SHEC requirements (the regulatory objectives)  and technical specifications constitutes the 
main characteristic of the new approach. This new approach is often denoted as “minimum 
harmonisation “ : what this refers to is not that regulation is somehow  (too ?) minimalistic but 
that all that is to be approximated are the objectives  and their essential links with voluntary, 
preferably common standards, but no more than that. Once these objectives are approximated, 
the rest is subject to MR. Common – though voluntary – standards are then desirable 
instruments to drastically lower information costs and uncertainty for business and technical 
designers in clarifying what critical specifications are presumed to be in compliance with 
these  (often quite general) SHEC objectives.  However, innovation is not throttled because 
new solutions may be tested and certified as well, as long as they comply with these 
objectives. The new approach, with much lower costs and far fewer blockages in the Council,  
has thus been greatly facilitated by the emergence of mutual recognition.  
 
The new approach is far superior to the old, rigid harmonisation approach the 
Community applied before 1985. But would regulatory competition, as a logical corollary of 
MR and precisely because it might   overcome market failures at least cost,  not be still better  
than approximation?  Approximation suggests that there is no prior equivalence between 
objectives of national regulation, otherwise mutual recognition should apply. A lack of 
equivalence could be due to the fact that some Member States have barrier-prone regulation 
and others have not, or, that objectives of all existing national regulation of a product do differ 
‘too much’. Under the ‘new approach’, approximation can be viewed as a written agreement 
in Council on equivalence. In actual practice, it turns out to be far more complex, because the 
new approach defines the objectives over wide product groups. As soon as the objectives have 
to be operationalised in mandates for European standardisation, great differentiation and some 
precision is often required, hence directives (have to) go further than just equivalence of 
objectives.  Indeed, the ECJ speaks about objectives or effects. Some economists have 
attempted to show that regulatory competition between Member States, driven by free 
movement under mutual recognition, can be (economically) superior to approximation. Given 
the equivalence of objectives, ‘the market’ (rather than civil servants and ministers) would 
reveal consumer and user preferences, and in this way the desired specifications could be 
‘discovered’, which can then be codified in directives to facilitate trade. Although this might 
possibly be correct in comparison with the ‘old’ approach, it is unlikely to be superior to the 
‘new approach’ (Sun & Pelkmans, 1995). In any event, where the new approach  fails because 
no qualified majority on objectives (or effects) can be found,  regulatory competition fails as 
well, because free movement would be blocked.  The issue of regulatory competition will be 
addressed below. 
                                                 
7 Adopted on 28 May 1969, (1969) OJ C 76/1.  For the drawbacks see Pelkmans, 1987 
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As Table 1 shows, liberalisation, MR and approximation cannot be understood in 
isolation but only within the notion of a regulatory strategy.  MR and (new approach) 
approximation can be substitutes or complements, and they may well serve different needs. 
 
 
2. The strategic advantages of mutual recognition  
 
 
            The  advantages of MR are of two types, strategic for the overall realisation of the 
internal market and the manifold benefits this implies, and direct (net) welfare benefits of the 
application in specific cases. The latter are dealt with in section 3. It would be a serious 
mistake to narrow down the economic analysis of MR to the comparative statics of  applying 
MR to a particular traded good as the strategic gains almost certainly outweigh the direct 
benefits greatly. 
 
            There are four strategic economic advantages of mutual recognition in goods markets. 
First, the internal goods market can be (and indeed has been) established far more easily and 
more quickly than would have been possible with old and new approaches of approximation 
combined with technical and unsatisfactory judicial review.  Second, the propensity to 
overregulate for vested interests or bureaucratic reasons is severely constrained both as to EC 
directives and at the national level. Third, even if regulatory competition does not seem to be 
pursued actively in the EU, mutual recognition creates the prerequisites for it; this potential 
for regulatory competition exercises an additional disciplinary effect on national regulators. 
Fourth, the interaction between MR and approximation under the new approach  (under 
qualified majority voting) forces Member States to rethink their national regulatory solut ions 
and focus on what is essential (the objectives) and what can usefully be subject to common 
(but voluntary) standards ; in so doing, time and again, regulators have to think in terms of 
mutual recognition (for all that is not “essential “). This prompts a process of learning among 
Member States about “best – practice “ regulation and reinforces the incentives to raise the 
quality of regulation at both levels in the European public interest. 
 
         These strategic advantages stem from the systemic implications of the notion of mutual 
recognition, not from the pure judicial application by the ECJ itself. It is important to see that 
a mere judicial application of MR  (a la Cassis de Dijon) would have been no more than a 
welcome handmaiden to the promotion of free movement in some selected product sectors. Its 
main application would have been limited to food products, with a few scattered instances in 
other markets as well. Only once one begins to understand its influence on the design of the 
new regulatory strategy of the Union  (after the White Paper of 1985 and the Single European 
Act) and its crucial role in that strategy, is it possible to discern and appreciate the strategic 
economic meaning of the principle. 
 
 The strategy consists of a triptych of a political, a judicial and a regulatory panel (see 
Exhibit 1).  The regulatory panel, in turn, is made up of a quintet.  With due account of the 
political and judicial panels, this regulatory quintet is central to the establishment and proper 
functioning of the single market, the economic hard core of the Union. 
 
 The Single Act removed the veto obstacle.  For most internal market matters qualified 
majority voting (=QMV) was de jure and de facto introduced.  This altered the conduct of 
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Member States representatives in Coreper and Council.  No longer could every detail and 
every deviation with other Member States be imposed on the Community:  compromises were 
either needed to obtain some concessions from others or they were indispensable to form a 
blocking minority.  QMV thereby reduced the costs of 'how' the EU regulated, while 
significantly lowering the probability of deadlock, so that the internal market could be built 
much faster. 
 
Exhibit 1 
The Union's new regulatory strategy 
 
political judicial regulatory 
qualified majority voting 
(with a few exceptions) 
judicial mutual recognition 
(given equivalent objectives 
or if Art 30 does not apply) 
® free movement 
® no internal frontiers 
® subsidiarity 
® minimum approximation / 
harmonisation 
® regulatory mutual 
recognition 
 proportionality (Member 
States) 
proportionality (EC level) 
source:  Pelkmans, 2001 –a, p. 59 
 
 
 The judicial panel has its roots in the 1970s, albeit only for goods markets, in the 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon cases.  This judicial form of mutual recognition is 
remarkable because in effect, it undermines the regulatory autonomy of a Member State with 
respect to intra-EU imports.   
 
Judicial mutual recognition proved capable of declaring inapplicable to intra-EU 
imports a very large number of regulatory specifications in food laws, and some in machine 
safety regulations, construction products, etc., etc.  In and by itself, it made superfluous a lot 
of tedious approximation that was deadlocked on the technical specifications, not on the 
regulatory objectives sought.  Just as qualified majority voting did after the Single Act, 
judicial mutual recognition altered the behaviour of Member States.  First, it came to be 
understood that the "need to act in common" (a required step of the subsidiarity test) at EU 
level often did not apply where health, (etc.) objectives were the same.  This had the practical 
effect of reducing the EU regulatory burden (that is, less approximation) while exposing 
national overregulation (with technical specifications) by free movement.  In one stroke, 
therefore, the probability of costly regulatory failure diminished greatly at both levels of 
government.  Or, to put it in a less abstract way, the potential total number of products waiting 
for EU regulation before free movement would become a reality for business and consumers 
was drastically curtailed. Moreover, existing, often detailed national regulation as well as 
possible future refinements became unenforceable vis-a-vis intra-EU imports. 
 
Second, it led to a re-think of how approximation could best be tackled whenever there 
was doubt about the equivalence of regulatory objectives.  Approximation was minimised to 
the 'essential requirements' of health, safety, environmental or consumer protection.  Beyond 
these regulatory objectives, Member States were free to regulate more strictly, but mutual 
recognition (and thus free movement) would apply.  This regulatory mutual recognition 
solved the problem of (business) uncertainty about 'equivalence' by defining common  
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minimum requirements in rather general terms, while imposing free movement and mutual 
recognition 'beyond' those requirements.  This had the great advantage that agreement in the 
Council would be far easier to achieve as, in Europe, regulatory objectives hardly diverge in 
the large majority of cases.  It meant that the establishment of the internal market became 
politically feasible. 
 
The Court also introduced another principle, that of 'proportionality'.  Because judicial 
mutual recognition may confuse consumers, as they are confronted with products from 
different regulatory regimes, it did accept labelling requirements as a 'least restrictive' 
measure to protect the consumer. Previous very costly measures such as complete import bans 
(e.g. beer into Germany ; pasta not fully made from durum wheat into Italy, etc) had to be 
removed. Thus asymmetric information can be solved at very little cost and without impeding 
free movement. 
 
The regulatory panel of Exhibit 1 emerged from this evolution.  With the Single Act's 
removal of internal frontiers and the Maastricht treaty's adoption of subsidiarity, the quintet 
was complete.  It is hard to overrate the economic significance of the regulatory quintet.  The 
combination of free movement, no internal frontiers and mutual recognition as well as 
proportionality at the Member States' level have led to a far greater and more intense 
competitive exposure of national goods markets than before the Single Act.   Should common 
regulatory action be necessary, it is nevertheless still bound by the combination of subsidiarity 
(as in the treaty, Art. 5-EC), minimum approximation and EU-level proportionality. 
 
There is one caveat.  Establishing the internal market while overcoming market 
failures and minimising regulatory failures should improve economic welfare, as a rule.  But 
this conclusion cannot be fully generalised. Consider the case of EU countries having very 
large differences in preferences: in some health, safety or environmental objectives they 
diverge sharply.  An inconsiderate application of free movement would preempt the 
satisfaction of the strictest local preferences (in say, environmental regulation).  Art 30, EC 
should prevent this from happening.  But approximation may similarly suppress such 
preferences if QMV overrules the relevant Member State(s). This might mean that common 
regulation to overcome market failure would lower welfare in some Member States.  
Assuming that the overruled preferences expressed in Council are widely held by the voters in 
these countries and do not merely reflect overt protectionism, this would be a serious 
drawback. 
 
There are two possible responses to this problem.  First, in Art 95, sub 4 an escape 
clause is formulated, under strict conditions, allowing a Member State to maintain stricter 
legislation without mutual recognition.  This clause has hardly been invoked thus far showing 
that it is not a pressing problem in actual practice.  Second, a Member State may maintain or 
enact stricter legislation, but of course subject to mutual recognition.  In economic terms, the 
effect will be that the regulatory costs will fall on the suppliers in the Member State itself.  If 
such preferences are truly wide-spread in the country, the satisfaction of these preferences 
may well offset the regulatory costs. 
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3. The economic welfare analysis of  mutual recognition 
 
The direct benefits of MR can be clarified with the help of rigorous welfare analysis,  
be it under somewhat restrictive assumptions. Realising that regulatory barriers are very 
different from tariff barriers or quotas, there are essentially two (different) ways of 
approaching the direct economic effect of MR. First, one can regard national standards and 
regulations as cost-increasing entry barriers and MR will then alter the competitive exposure 
of domestic firms, hitherto operating in fairly sheltered national markets.  Second, one can 
regard national SHEC rules or voluntary standards and (tough) conformity assessment as 
quality signalling.  In such a setting, the cost differential may simply reflect quality 
competition and a need to invest in reputation building.  These two contrasting perspectives 
can both be relevant, dependent on the nature of the goods market.  With the steady 
Europeanisation of standards, whether linked to directives or not (hence, MR), the problem 
could be expected to fade away in another one or two decades (except perhaps in building 
products where also the US continues to have perennial barriers in its internal market). 
 
 
 First, the analysis will focus on a simple three countries / one -good model, with 
constant costs for the rest of the world (= ROW) and increasing costs for the two EU 
countries, L and H.  Consider Figure 18 showing the market in H.    The good is homogenous 
between ROW, L and H (no quality differences), but regulations between L and H differ, 
causing adjustment costs. 
 
Figure 1 
Mutual recognition and homogenous goods  
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                                                                                 SL2 
 
                                                                                           SH + exc. /L 
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        P3              D’ 
          P1 
          Pw                                                                                                SROW 
                                                                             DH 
 
 
 
                                                                                                           q 
 
The high-cost country H is not fully protected by the Union's common external tariff (CET) 
and  CD of imports from ROW enter.  The low-cost country L could easily export to H over its 
                                                 
8 Figure 1 extends the notion of 'cost increasing trade barriers' ( emphasized  by Pelkmans & Winters, 1988, pp. 
18-20 as distinct from tariffs which are revenue generating, and this property is crucial in customs union theory) 
to mutual recognition. Figure 1 is adapted from  Abraham, 1991, pp. 6-15 . 
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excess-supply curve (as drawn in the H market) SH + exc. / L. 9   Its potential exports to H would 
be FE; if so, ROW would be squeezed out of the market as in simple customs union theory.  
However, with non-harmonized and non-recognized national technical regulations, L incurs 
an adjustment cost, in Figure 1 assumed to be the vertical difference between SH + exc. / L and 
SL2, hence, a given percentage of the cost price.  It is (arbitrarily) drawn such that it goes 
through D and leaves enough exports into H so as to squeeze out ROW at the price Pw(1 + 
CET).  Would the adjustment be a little higher, L firms would refrain from exporting to H.  
Thus, in the internal market for homogenous goods, still characterized by regulatory barriers, 
we find that: 
(a) trade diversion  may still occur, but, dependent on the (cost- increasing) barriers, it 
may also be reduced or absent; it also depends on whether the world price does or 
does not include similar adjustment costs as L experiences when entering H   
(b) both L and H keep very high domestic market shares when regulatory barriers are not 
tackled; indeed, dependent on the cost of adjustment to the regulation in H, the 
internal market may well remain segmented; 
(c) the consequence of partial or complete segmentation is price  disparities  in the EU, 
despite tariff- free trade in the EU and the homogeneity of the good; if SL2 were 
relevant, or if it were situated even higher, the price prevailing in H  would be Pw ( 1 
+ CET) ;  in L the domestic market clearing price would be P 1  and adding excess 
supply CD ( = C’ D’)  would increase it to P 3  ; hence a considerable price disparity 
would arise  
 
Note that 'old-approach' type of harmonisation (as distinct from mutual recognition or, as in 
Figure 1, from cost- increasing barriers only for exports to H, yet not domestically) would, due 
to vetoes and technical specificities, probably lead to 'maximum' requirements for standards 
and/or testing, in other words, close to or identical with those of H.  The effect of this is not 
visible in the graph as nothing would alter in H but in L it would cause a price-hike.  It would 
wipe out the competitive advantages of L, clearly something companies will fiercely resist.  
This simple analysis shows one major drawback of the 'old approach':  it provides power to 
protect a high-cost industry, protected by regulatory barriers,10 rather than a 'liberalisation' of 
the internal market.  The seductive plea for a 'level-playing field' may be very costly and 
throttle (potential) intra-EU trade. 
 
The introduction of 'mutual recognition' (assuming that 'equivalence' is not a problem) 
drastically alters the picture.  In Figure 1, L no longer incurs an adjustment cost and will 
export FE to H. The market share of domestic H producers is more or less halved (an absolute 
decline of sales, for a larger total quantity) which will prompt rationalisation and 
restructuring.  Consumers in H gain with the price fall, but consumers in L lose as the EU will 
now enjoy one price (P2).  Note that, if the restructuring  of H-based firms does not lead SH to 
shift down considerably (an improvement of technical efficiency), these firms cannot exploit 
mutual recognition by exporting to L.  Trade diversion would now be certain in Figure 1.11 
  
                                                 
9 Beyond the market clearance price PL
 1, its excess supply is horizontally added to H's domestic supply 
schedule.  
10 Not seldomly, the barrier may have relaxed the cost minimisation discipline of external competition (so the 
stakes to keep it, become more entrenched over time), or, indeed the barrier is fully endogenous, in the sense that 
regulators have been captured to 'tailor' the barrier so as to protect sufficiently. 
11 Clearly this was one fear behind the 'fortress Europe' campaign of the US in the late 1980s.  In actual practice, 
one has to be careful to draw this conclusion.  The ECJ has been quite liberal here:  thus if ROW would obtain 
acceptance of its product in any Member State of the EU, mutual recognition would apply in full throughout the 
internal market. 
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 In this simple analysis, therefore, mutual recognition boils down to a pro-competitive 
regulatory regime. 
 
 Second, the analysis will stylise a case where SHEC regulations can be considered as 
quality signalling.  Let us assume that domestic regulations refer to national standards which 
reflect quality; different national standards reflect quality differentials.  The distinction 
between regulations and standards is crucial -- without mutual recognition, the regulations 
constitute barriers, but with mutual recognition (hence, equivalence as to the 'essential 
requirements') only the voluntary quality standards remain, and hence the price/quality 
combinations are determined by consumers and users.  So, quality refers to 'non-SHEC 
requirements' like solidity, guarantees, materials, ingredients (including 'recipes' in the case of 
food products), technical sophistication, durability, design or after-sales service.  Now 
consider Figure 2 which links (cost) prices to levels of quality in L and H (ROW  is ignored).12   
Both countries have (different) minimum qualities Lmin and Hmin.  The price/quality curves are 
convex, expressing the idea that ever higher quality becomes increasingly expensive.  
However, dependent on soft and hard infrastructure as well as experience, given domestic 
preferences (themselves a function of per capita income levels), H is a typical high-cost 
producer in the low-qualities range (between Lmin and Q2) and L in the high-qualities range 
(beyond Q2 or E).13 
 
 
Figure 2 
Mutual recognition and quality signalling 
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 With intra-EU trade opened up, under regulatory barriers, L can sell in H only beyond 
Hmin  up to Q2 (i.e. over CE) and H can sell in L only beyond Q2 (or E).  This squares with the 
notion that differentiated goods will generally sell in both markets. 
 
                                                 
12 Figure 2 (as adapted) draws from Abraham, 1991 and Falvey, 1989.  Note that there is no volume in this 
graph. 
13 Note that, compared to Figure 1, no (further) adjustment costs are assumed. 
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 Now mutual recognition is introduced.  For simplicity we take this to mean that all 
qualities at or beyond Lmin  can be sold in the internal market.  For L producers, the extra 
business opportunity is to sell now in H in the Lmin  - Hmin (AC) range.  Seizing this 
opportunity depends however, on the effectiveness of the quality signal.  Consumers in H may 
mistrust the lower price of the L product for lower quality compared to H products in the same 
range.  This lack of confidence is caused by the disappearance of the H-testing mark or 
certificate, so that consumers have an information problem.  Beyond Hmin this is less of a 
problem because H quality traditions are adhered to; still, convincing consumers of this very 
fact might require extra effort (for example, voluntary certification).  In other words, L will 
need to invest in reputation building or it would systematically ensure that its products are 
tested and certified to compliance with H standards.14 
 
 These efforts shift the 1LC curve to 
2
LC .  L producers will now sell in H any quality 
between Lmin  up to Q1 (over LF) but lose competitiveness vis-a-vis H firms in the range FE.  
Another interesting effect has to do with the fear of a 'race to the bottom'.  In figure 2  the 
opposite occurs  -- it leads to what David Vogel (1995) has called, 'trading up', a convergence 
to higher quality levels. 
 
 If, in contrast to the earlier assumption, we assume that SHEC objectives play a role to 
set  a  minimum quality (say, of safety; or an  emission ceiling), then one obtains a 
combination of minimum harmonisation, and mutual recognition beyond it, based on quality.  
This could represent a stylized 'new approach'.  In Figure 2, EUmin represents the regulatory 
minimum, in the light of SHEC objectives, but this (often) says relatively little about the 
overall quality properties of machines, toys, etc.  As shown, this could lead to the exit of 
producers in the very low quality range between Lmin and EUmin.  Whether this is a welfare 
loss depends on whether Lmin did or did not fully overcome the market failure.15 
 
 Analytical work in more sophisticated models is still scant and the results are not 
comparable because of disparate approaches.  Box 1 provides a flavour of this kind of 
economic research. 
 
Box 1 
Mutual recognition and imperfect competition 
 
Advanced economic analysis has ignored mutual recognition, with a few exceptions.  In 
Lutz (1996) harmonisation and mutual recognition are compared in a model of vertical 
product differentiation, which builds on work by Shaked & Sutton (1982) and Ronnen (1991), 
for the two-countries case.  Duopolistic firms face quality-dependent fixed costs and compete 
in quality and price.  in two segmented markets.  When firms have identical cost functions, the 
introduction of mutual recognition yields the maximal sum of regional  welfares, compared to 
harmonisation or 'no regulation'.  A harmonised regulation, maximising the sum of national 
welfares, will lead to a reduction of welfare in H.  But when costs of the L firms increase (and 
indeed increasingly with higher quality, as in Figure 2), these results are partially reversed.  
Indeed, with a high enough cost differential, harmonisation with only one firm in the market is 
superior in welfare.  The exit of L firms is in the overall (welfare) interest of the country.  Lutz 
is capable of showing, be it in a highly stylized fashion, that entry deterrence by strategically 
                                                 
14 Note that, here, there is no CE  marking since this only applies to an EC directive.  CE marking is completely 
independent from the (EU) country of testing & certification. 
15 The problem with market failures such as safety and health objectives is that they are not independent from 
local preferences and income levels, hence, the risk/price preferences matter to some degree. 
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choosing quality is possible (see also Herguera & Lutz, 1998). 
 
A somewhat different two-stage game, with Cournot duopoly and two countries, is 
presented by Suwa-Eisenmann & Verdier (2002).  It is an extension of the well-known 
Brander & Spencer model (1985) and introduces a political support function (i.e. the 
government only looks at producers' interest).  Mutual recognition is interesting once the 
'institutional capacity' of L and H differs in supporting all what such recognition takes (in 
quality & conformance infrastructure) at low costs.  This would tend to move implicit 
regulatory protection towards an asymmetric increase in the cost of L producers exporting to H 
(in other words, it favours H as if it were a tariff). 
 
 
 
The conclusion is that mutual recognition in homogeneous goods markets tends to be 
strongly pro-competitive whereas in differentiated goods markets there are likely to be 
forceful incentives for “trading up “, the opposite of a race-to-the-bottom. However, in 
models of imperfect competition (and given that mutual recognition requires equivalent 
objectives of domestic regulation, including reliable conformity assessment) there is scope for 
strategic quality games. In such games the competitiveness of low-cost lower-quality 
suppliers might sometimes be affected.  
 
 
 
4. The costs of  mutual recognition 
 
After two decades of judicial MR and one and a half of a regulatory application of the 
principle in goods market, the picture emerging is one of great ambiguity. 
 
On the one hand, there can be no denying of the great merits of introducing this 
innovative principle.  Many instances of silly and de-facto protectionist import bans have 
been removed.  An entirely new approach to food law has been developed at EU level which 
is solely focussed on SHEC objectives or effects, without -- as a rule -- specifying the 
individual products concerned.  When the quality of goods -- beyond 'essential' issues of 
SHEC -- is concerned, the consumer disposes, based on mere labelling requirements (so as to 
remove asymmetries of information).  Beyond food and beverages, it is possible to identify a 
range of goods market where MR applies.  Based on the Atkins report for the Single Market 
Review (Atkins, 1998), it is estimated that nearly 50% of intra-EU goods trade is subject to 
MR and the rest is covered by the old and new approaches. Of the 50 % covered by MR some 
20% refers to unregulated goods (say, teaspoons)  and another 30% to nationally regulated 
ones (say, beer, pasta, carpets, etc.).   
 
Yet, one has to answer the questions whether this figure means that (1) without MR 
these markets would not enjoy free movement?; (2) with MR they do enjoy unhindered 
market access?  Both questions should be answered with a qualified 'no'.  The completely 
unregulated markets would probably enjoy free movement without any problems.  But the 
nationally regulated ones would cause higher costs of intra-EU trade or force local 
establishments or block trade.  So, the identifiable gains should be looked for only in those 
markets.  However, when question 2 is considered, it turns out that there are numerous 
practical problems in enjoying market access, even when MR  should formally apply.  These 
problems can cause a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty, and have indeed engendered a 
sense of disenchantment with the principle. We shall discuss the generic “costs” of mutual 
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recognition   and what to do about them in the present section; a brief review of the belated 
strategy at EU level to reduce these costs is included as well. In section 7 the more specific 
costs which tend to fall on business are set out, with some examples from goods markets. 
There is also evidence that MR in those services markets where the principle could matter is 
little exploited by business. 
 
Mutual recognition turns out to have fairly high information, transaction and 
compliance costs. Apart from some specific costs to business (see section 7), there are six 
reasons for these costs to be high. First,  MR is not “visible”. For a particular tradeable good 
in markets MR is a distant abstraction. What makes it even more difficult is that the national 
rules in a country are usually well-known and can be easily verified, yet they are overridden 
by this abstraction. It is obvious that in many cases such a configuration cannot be expected to 
lead to the required degree of legal certainty in day-to-day business throughout a big internal 
market trading many tens of thousands of goods. Perhaps one could best regard MR as a 
“regulatory “ principle with several layers: whereas the general principle will necessarily 
remain abstract, if only for its applicability in a wide variety of cases, the sufficient conditions 
for  low-cost applicability  amount to several layers of much more practical guidelines which 
should be  easily verifiable. This is confirmed by the other five reasons for the generic costs 
of MR.  
 
Second, there is no rule book for MR, indeed, if anything MR applies the negative of a 
rule book. Clearly, for inspectors, certifiers and indeed traders themselves this can be a 
drawback when one realizes how fast modern markets and exchange works. The EU 
authorities and possibly national ones as well could undoubtedly be pro-active at this ‘lower ‘  
layer of MR. As we shall see this has finally been realized by the Union during the last few 
years. Third, one important reason of the gap between the principle and its application in day-
to-day business is the lack of clarity about the equivalence of effects.  The ECJ has always 
spoken about equivalence of  ‘objectives or effects ‘. Although objectives can cause 
difficulties occasionally, even when the leap to approximation is not taken, the interpretation 
of effects risks to (re-)introduce a good deal of the regulatory specifications that should be of 
little or no significance under MR. Hence, the importance of the new approach  where 
voluntary standards deal with the effects in a useful but not restrictive manner. But where MR 
applies in the presence of some national regulation, the ‘effects ‘clause creates a grey area 
which raises the costs of MR. Again, these costs can be reduced by pro-active policies. 
Fourth, the costs of monitoring are very high. It is out of the question to monitor each and 
every individual case of MR.  The high costs of monitoring may even prompt strategic 
behaviour on the part of some authorities in some specific cases, not least when viewed in 
combination with the next drawback. Fifth, judicial review in the EU is slow because of the 
overload of the ECJ and the huge increase in the requested ‘preliminary rulings ‘ (not seldom 
on MR cases).  Of course, this drawback is not specific to MR but the application and indeed 
the conduct of national regulatory authorities and testing/certification institutes is likely to be 
directly affected by it. Sixth, the application of MR has turned out to be much more complex 
than originally envisaged. The more complicated its interpretation and the more ‘grey areas’ 
and special cases, the more it approaches an EU-based regulatory system, whereas the idea is 
precisely to avoid EU rules and allow diversity to be combined with free movement. Once 
again, the complexity calls for a pro-active policy of information and lowering of transaction 
costs. 
 
In discussing what the Union has done in order to lower the costs of MR  one should 
distinguish the activities and debates about  existing regulatory barriers and the EU 
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infrastructure about newly emerging regulatory barriers due to new legislation in Member 
States. 
As to the existing regulatory barriers the doubts about the effectiveness of MR in 
goods markets began after the EC-1992 programme was completed. Following regular 
complaints from European business and an ad-hoc conference in Copenhagen between the 
Commission and European business on a Danish list of no less than 400 instances where MR 
had allegedly failed, two initiatives were taken to address the issues. The Molitor (1995) 
report on simplification of European regulation recommended that the actual benefits of MR 
were often outweighed by the costs of uncertainty, hence, approximation would often be 
better.  The 1995 UNICE report took a similar stance.  The Atkins report on technical barriers 
(1998) in the Single Market Review documents both deep scepticism amongst economic 
agents in markets about MR and analyses, in 7 case studies, how rarely MR works out the 
way (naive?) economists might be led to believe (see also section 7).  A 1999 Commission 
report16 finally acknowledges that MR requires a far wider, deeper and pro-active 
infrastructure in the single goods market to make it work.  One can also infer from this paper 
that there is no, what I call, "MR culture” yet in the Union.  
 
 Such a culture would comprise at least three 'soft' but critical ingredients which are 
nowadays still lacking: (1) economic agents well- informed about the 'rights' MR implies for 
their business, trade or consumptive activities; (2) confidence between Member States, and 
more specifically their various regulatory, inspection and/or certification agencies, about 
specifications and actual enforcement;  (3) incentives for whatever national bodies  having a 
direct or indirect impact on free movement (under MR) to think and act 'European' rather than 
national -- the point here is that the incentive structure is tilted the other way around.  The 
information -- confidence -- Union-mindset combination could do much to render MR far 
more effective.  However, this requires deep and permanent investments and possible some 
restructuring. 
 
The Barcelona European Council (15/16 March 2002) asked the Commission to report 
(once again!) on technical barriers to trade.  This signals a persistent concern about MR when 
it comes to the day-to-day enforcement in the single market.  The Commission has opened the 
SOLVIT initiative in 2002 for infringement cases where the reason seems to be 
'misapplication' of EC law in goods and services -- often, a matter of MR. In May 2002, such 
cases numbered no less than 681!17  This is likely to be only the well-known tip of an iceberg 
of unreported frustrations of free movement. 
More specifically, the second Commission report on MR18 comprises for the first time 
a much more pro-active approach with activities such as regular conferences & round tables, 
the publication of guides and guidelines and detailed case studies as the basis for common 
interpretation. At the same time this report testifies the complications of MR in all areas. 
Nevertheless, the Commission is more adamant than ever to ensure better and more 
widespread compliance with MR, for the better functioning of the internal market.    
 
The EU has done much better in permanently preventing new regulatory barriers from 
arising year after year. The infrastructure consists of a little known yet crucial committee, 
backed up by exceptionally strong information powers as well as strict obligations of Member 
                                                 
16 COM (1999) 299 of 16 June 1999, Mutual recognition in the context of the follow-up to the Action Plan for 
the Single Market. 
17 Internal Market Scoreboard, no. 10, May 2002, p.10. 
18 COM (2002) 419 of 23 July 2002, Second biannual report on the Application of the Principle of Mutual 
Recognition in the Single Market. 
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States to accept EU priorities in their national legislative processes.  The 98/34 Committee 
(formerly known as 83/189 Ctee) deals with all national draft laws having a bearing, actual or 
potential, on regulatory barriers in goods markets.  The Committee does this before these 
drafts reach national parliaments and under automatic or discretionary 'standstills' (of the 
national legislation process) of anything between 3 and 18 months!  Member States and the 
Commission give 'detailed opinions' if regulatory barriers are suspected or expected and, in 
any event, 'equivalence' and/or MR clauses have to be incorporated in every such law. In 
doing so, new regulatory barriers are nipped in the bud and MR is not only allowed to work, it 
is encouraged by explicit references to equivalence. In effect, therefore, the 98/34 committee 
protects MR for all new laws of Member States. Only in very rare cases that no equivalence 
exists the Commission will propose an approximation directive. With hindsight it is clear that 
this committee has rescued the functioning of the internal goods market. Without this 
infrastructure a singular focus on the existing barriers, even with MR, would have been 
hopelessly ineffective given the extremely high rate at which Member States add new sources 
of barriers where MR could lead to uncertainties. The work of this committee also shows that 
a pro-active approach, based on firm powers, is the only way to render MR effective and (via 
equivalence clauses in national law) transparent. 
 
The functioning of this low-key but critical committee has revealed to what extent 
Member States have turned into 'regulatory machines' (see also Pelkmans, Vos & di Mauro, 
2000 for detailed analysis).  The last few years the 15 Member States produce, year after year, 
some 650 - 700 laws and decrees (or non-trivial amendments of them) which have to pass the 
Committee.  If that number is no reason to pause and wonder whether market functioning is 
genuinely improved by such a regulatory 'turnover', one ought to realise that (a) this only 
refers to goods markets19, (b) Member States are not allowed to draft laws in 'approximated' 
markets, other than implementation of the directives20.  So these 700-odd laws or decrees only 
deal with MR-type markets, covering a mere 30% of intra-EU goods trade!  After 18 years of 
the operation of this committee the beginnings of an “MR culture “ can be discerned. 
However, the national instincts and incentives to come up with a lot of new regulation, year 
after year, remain forceful. It is also unclear whether the incipient MR culture in the 
committee spills over to the tackling of existing barriers where MR should apply. Fortunately, 
to  the extent that the committee is a success, the area of existing barriers should no longer 
grow and a pro-active MR policy by the EU might become effective in lowering the generic 
costs of MR in those goods. 
 
 
5.         Mutual recognition in services markets                            
 
           It took some time before mutual recognition came to be applied to services in the 
internal market. In 1979  - the year of the Cassis-de-Dijon ruling -   the liberalisation of cross-
border services had hardly begun and was therefore far behind the progress in goods markets. 
By the time the EC-1992 programme was designed services had become more prominent and 
the question was rather how to tackle the many services markets that were regulated, and 
indeed differently regulated in different types of services markets. 
 The basics in the treaty looked like those in goods in that there is a clear obligation to 
remove restrictions on the free movement of services (art. 49, EC ; then art 59) and that non-
discrimination is the rule. Like in goods there are derogations from non-discrimination (art.  
46, then art. 56) and these tend to be narrowly interpreted by the ECJ. The analogy with goods 
                                                 
19 And a small category of 'information services'. 
20 Anyway, these are not notified to this Committee. 
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also extends to the judicial approach to restrictions of a non-discriminatory kind in the 1991 
Saeger case21, just like the famous Dassonville ruling of 1974 in goods. Hence, these 
restrictions should be judged from an economic perspective: restrictions “.. liable to prohibit 
or otherwise impede “ cross-border services of the  “temporary “ type are not allowed. This 
economic approach covers measures affecting the ability to provide, those increasing the costs 
of the relevant service (a very wide-ranging prohibition, like in Dassonville), those 
discouraging its provision and those preventing consumers from receiving the service.  
            It is then a small step to introduce the Cassis-de-Dijon analogy, that is, the notion of 
judicial mutual recognition. 22 A Member State cannot normally prohibit the provision, in its 
own territory, of a service lawfully provided in another Member State, even if the conditions 
in which it is provided are different in the country where the service provider is established. 
As with goods this mutual recognition even applies in case of derogations as long as the 
legitimate objectives pursued in different Member States are equivalent. 
           Nevertheless, it would seem that the practical economic significance of judicial MR in 
services is fairly limited. The wide derogations of art. 46, EC and a host of other objectives 
(often under the  ‘general good ‘ doctrine, a kind of rule-of-reason approach, developed by the 
ECJ)  can be legally compatible with the treaty, even though free movement of services is 
thereby severely curtailed. The ECJ will verify this compatibility using three tests: a 
restrictive justification test (overriding reasons of public interests), a non-duplication test (for 
statutory conditions, if equivalent, already satisfied in the home country) and the 
proportionality test (barriers should be indispensable and least-restrictive). The ECJ approach 
has helped to remove all kinds of arbitrary   protectionism or overregulation. In and by itself, 
however, judicial MR and the compatibility tests of derogations have not resulted in truly free 
movement of services in most markets. 
 
         To understand why this is so, three crucial properties of services provision in the 
internal market should be considered. First, many services markets are regulated. Although 
judicial MR might sometimes suffice to obtain free movement, the information, confidence 
and transaction costs of MR are likely to be much higher in the case of services than for 
goods. Services are not storable and also intangible which renders it difficult to assess quality. 
Services are typically not search goods (the buyer can verify quality before consumption, as in 
goods markets) but either experience goods (evaluation of quality only possible after 
consumption) or credence goods (quality cannot even be assessed after consumption).   Such 
markets tend to suffer from asymmetries of information and this can lead to a range of 
inefficiences (including moral hazard and adverse selection). Suitable regulation ought to 
ensure a proper functioning of such markets. The gradual establishment of the internal market 
for services in the EU has shown that the reduction of these costs of MR may require a 
regulatory approach to MR, that is, directives specifying the objectives and (main) effects, 
beyond which MR applies.  
 
        Second, most of the larger (non-governmental) services markets fall under special 
regimes in the treaty which assume priority before free movement of services (art. 49, EC) 
applies. This renders services incomparable to goods trade in economic terms. Financial 
services, transport services (all six modes) and all services in network industries  (including 
telecoms, broadcasting, postal and the distribution services of gas and electricity) have special 
articles or chapters in the EC treaty. All of these tend to be heavily regulated (both for 
services and for establishment) and a judicial form of MR cannot easily be expected to be 
                                                 
21 Case C-76/90 
22 The following paragraphs are based on an interpretative communication  by the European Commission on the 
free movement of services, Official Journal EC, C 334 of 9 December 1993 
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workable. The internal market will require either far-reaching approximation of rules and 
supervision or regulatory MR or some combination of the two.  
 
 
Exhibit 2 
Services trade and mutual recognition 
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  (road haulage, river, sea, bus)                              air transport  
  MR applies / home country control           selective / residual MR possible 
 
  business services 
- professional services 
- advisory services 
- certification, testing, etc. 
- data processing; logistics 
- market research 
   licencing / MR diploma’s 
    (often) judicial MR of services 
 
 
all services 
tradeable non-tradeable 
non-regulated regulated 
non-networked services network-based services 
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        Third, the economics of services provision, such as the simultane ity of production and 
consumption of services  (in many cases), the frequently inevitable proximity of supplier to 
the customer  (both in B2B and B2C) and the importance of reputation and confidence, 
strongly suggests that the determinants of the volume and nature of cross-border services are 
not comparable to those of goods trade. To put it simple, the formal removal of regulatory 
barriers may well prompt a much greater response in goods trade than in services trade, even 
if everything else were equal. But everything else is not equal in at least two respects: many 
services submarkets are characterized by some degree of market power  (for reasons such as 
product differentiation, reputation, consumer loyalty, existing networks, etc.) and this is 
probably a greater obstacle to market penetration than in goods markets in a number of 
instances,  and the incentives  to substitute service provision through local establishment for 
cross-border provision is far stronger than in goods trade precisely because of proximity and 
confidence reasons.  
 
        Like in goods mutual recognition applies only to a limited number of cases. However, in 
services there is no such thing as the ‘old ‘ approach of total and detailed harmonisation. It is 
true that, for a long time, the Transport Council was split on how much (intrusive) 
harmonisation would be required before free movement of transport services would apply but 
no decisions of the  ‘old ‘ approach kind were actually taken. Once the Council had been 
convicted  (!) by the ECJ in 1985  (on request of the European Parliament, nota bene) for its 
failure to establish a common transport policy, as the treaty clearly prescribed, the EC pursued 
a ‘new approach ‘ with minimum approximation and mutual recognition (see below). 
Compared to the categorisation of goods trade falling under either judicial MR (unregulated 
or equivalence) or old approach  (no scope for any MR due to uniformity) or the new 
approach  (approximation only of  ‘objectives ‘ and key issues of  ‘effects’ if any ;  mutual 
recognition beyond it), a somewhat different categorisation is best used in services as Exhibit 
2 sets out.       
 
        Whereas most goods are tradeable  there exists a large category of services which is not, 
including pure governmental services, local private services  (e.g. a haircut, etc.), all non-
distance education (a major sector) and a very large part of health services. The tradeable 
services have to be split into non-regulated services where MR is not necessary (such as 
tourism, the service sector with the biggest turnover in Europe, and business services such as 
consulting and voluntary conformance services), and regulated ones. Regulated services, in 
turn, can be divided into network industries and non-networked services. The former services 
depend critically on physical or logistical networks with enormous sunk costs and are 
typically subject to public (or universal) service obligations. The liberalisation and proper 
pursuit of competitive cross-border services in network industries is complex and requires 
sophisticated combinations of approximation, supervision (by ‘regulators ‘) and competition 
policy (see European Commission, 1999, 2000; Pelkmans, 2001 b). Within strict limits 
selective and /or residual instances of MR (e.g. of licensing) remain possible. 
 
       It is in the realm of non-networked regulated services that mutual recognition has 
regulatory and economic significance. Two distinct approaches are employed. In financial 
services and (non-networked) transport services a regulatory form of MR, based on 
approximation of  “essential requirements “, coupled to  “home country control” has been 
opted for. Home country control adds another innovative twist to the originality of mutual 
recognition. In financial services the EU has chosen to differentiate between the institutions 
supplying services  (that is, banks, insurance companies and merchant banks and the like) and 
the services themselves. Knowing that approximation of the essential requirements of the 
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services themselves might be very difficult and slow  (indeed, a  “new  approach “ might be 
infeasible, certainly in the mid-1980s, before the wave of financial innovation and large scale 
application of IT to financial services), the financial soundness of institutions was tackled as 
follows. Approximation of the key rules for financial soundness and the obligations of 
national supervisors to verify this on a permanent basis was achieved  (think of minimum 
capital, solvency, large (risk) exposure, etc.) and far-reaching cooperation about automatic 
access to detailed information between the national supervisors established, which provided a 
solid basis to allow these sound financial institutions to do cross-border business anywhere in 
the internal market (at a distance or via simple branches or support offices in the host 
country). No authorisation in the host country is necessary unless one changes to full 
subsidiaries. Thus, the bank or insurance licence in one Member State becomes a  “passport” 
to do business all over the Union. The mutual recognition refers to the 
authorisation/supervision regimes amongst the Member States so that confidence in country B 
in a financial institution offering services there but originating from country A can be based 
on the “home country control”  (under common rules, to be sure)  in A. Close cooperation and 
information exchange among regulators irons out any remaining problems. Since the services 
are not approximated  (except a part of consumer credits) one might ask whether judicial MR 
in the services themselves could not yield substantial cross-border business and, eventually, 
perhaps a process of regulatory competition facilitating a “new approach “ or market-driven 
convergence. The answer here is that the ECJ itself has made this very difficult by developing 
the  “general good doctrine “ protecting a host of regulatory interventions by Member States 
from free movement.23 Although this doctrine is now increasingly confined to B2C 
transactions – as asymmetries of information are much more serious there -  the application of 
judicial MR to the services themselves has had little practical impact thus far 24. 
 
         In road haulage as the dominant mode of non-networked transport services, the so-called 
common transport policy now realized consists of mutual recognition of the licensing based 
on approximation (hence, home country control as well) and approximation of the safety and 
environmental requirements of the vehicles (i.e. goods) and the driving times of the drivers. 
Free movement has turned out to be easy and indeed has been aggressively exploited, with 
steady growth of cross-border trucking ever since EC-1992. The major issue in road haulage 
is the appropriate allocation of user costs of infrastructure in countries refusing to have 
tollroads, which has nothing to do with MR.  
 
         In business services regulation is uneven and generalisations are dangerous.25 The 
present paper is not the place to analyse the problems. For the sake of comparison, however, 
one might say that the application of judicial MR   is the rule, yet has turned out to be 
exceedingly difficult in actual practice. Where licensing plays a role in these markets the 
mutual recognition tends to be of a different nature, namely based on MR of diplomas. There 
is an old and a new approach in diploma recognition but it is doubtful how well each of them 
really facilitates cross-border provision, especially but not only in professional services.26. 
          
         In conclusion, mutual recognition has been applied to services with ingenuity, based on 
analogous case law (as in goods) and the notion of ‘home country control’. The sector where 
                                                 
23 See, for a revealing analysis two communications by the Commission in Official Journal EC C 209 of 10 July 
1997 and  idem C 43 of 16 February 2000 
24 The reader is referred to the contribution by Piergaetano Marchetti in this volume as well as Hertig (2001) 
25 For a detailed analysis of barriers to cross-border trade  see  COM (2002) 441 of 30 July 2002  on the state of 
the internal market for services 
26 See the chapter by  Kalypso Nicolaides in this volume 
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this has worked best is least known for MR, namely road haulage. The reason is presumably 
that regulation of services and firms in road haulage is relatively light, whereas truck 
regulation falls under goods rules. In financial services MR of ‘home country control’ has 
undoubtedly been a clever regulatory innovation but it has served as little more than a 
necessary, not a sufficient condition to boost cross-border services provision. That ‘deeper’ 
regulatory commitments were required was recognized by all the EU players and lawmakers 
when the Financial Services Action Plan was adopted in 2000, for completion in 2005. As far 
as MR of the financial services themselves are concerned, the ‘general good’ doctrine has 
been a far too wide and almost open-ended inhibition of cross-border service provision. The 
limitation of the doctrine to B2C transactions is an improvement but the doctrine itself should 
be reconsidered. A third reason why MR in financial services is of limited economic 
significance has to do with the relatively great need for proximity to customers for reasons of 
trust, consumer loyalty and service quality. The link between FDI and service provision is 
therefore very strong. 
            
This is also the case in business services. Nevertheless, in business services there are 
numerous opportunities for irregular cross-border services trade without FDI but the practical 
problems are still considerable. The link with diploma recognition for all professional services 
and some other ones as well, an array of local regulations, problems with FDI and a litany of 
obstacles about contracts for ‘posted’ workers (essential for occasional contracting), not to 
speak about the reluctance of SMEs to complain are amongst the more important issues. 
            
Altogether, in services even more than in goods MR requires pro-active policies. It 
should be realized that there is no committee like 98/34 in goods and, until recently, the 
European Commission did not pay systematic attention to cross-border services problems. 
The Member States, the regions and local authorities hardly display anything like a ‘MR 
culture’. The underutilisation of MR and the lack of competitive challenge across borders is 
not particularly helpful for Europe’s dynamism in services. Pro-active policies, embedded in 
an EU-driven infrastructure to follow this systematically, are badly needed. 
 
 
 
6. Assessing regulatory competition 
 
 Regulatory competition between Member States would seem to be a natural 
consequence of mutual recognition, under free movement obligations.  MR will expose 
national regulation to the forces of arbitrage:  consumers may choose between domestic 
regulation and that of any other Member State by importing the relevant goods or services.  
To the extent that even production factors find it profitable to respond to regulatory 
differences, mutual recognition and free movement may induce cross-border factor flows.  All 
this should improve welfare on account of greater variety and additional output in the EU.  
But, since mutual recognition is a static notion, no more than a one-time adjustment would 
take place. 
 
 Regulatory competition is dynamic and takes this process further.  It is defined as 
changes in national regulation in response to the actual or expected impact of cross-border 
mobility of goods or services on national economic activity, itself prompted by MR (Sun & 
Pelkmans, 1995).  Behind this alteration of national rules one may find complex business-
government interactions.  Jurisdictions with costly regulations may find businesses pressing 
for reductions in their regulatory burden when faced with import competition from 
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jurisdictions with 'light' regimes.  Alternatively, local businesses and governments may agree 
on strategic de-regulation with the aim of boosting certain activities in the internal market.   
Since this may also be practised, or responded to, by other Member States, iterative processes 
of regulatory competition may develop.  Where Member States would maintain ambitious 
regulation, the costs will fall on that Member State's economy; this can be interpreted as 
meaning that the local benefits of satisfying these preferences are more than worth the local 
costs.  Quality or other non-price determinants induced by this regulation would make 
products from other jurisdictions poor substitutes, and hence would protect local business 
from suffering too much from import competition.  When factor mobility is at issue, location 
benefits (after taking account of sunk costs of establishment) would apparently outweigh the 
benefits of relocation at the margin.  The notion of regulatory competition implies that the 
maintenance of  regulatory differences despite exposure to arbitrage  would be economically 
justified in view of disparate preferences. 
 
 As a rule, however, one would expect a process of regulatory competition to induce 
'market driven' regulatory convergence in the EC.  The condition for optimality is that this 
should not be allowed where negative externalities produce the relevant market failure as this 
would lead to fragmentation of the internal market or too low regulation (exposing the 
environment, for example, or failing to deal with discriminatory measures), but it would be 
suitable if information asymmetries or other 'internalities' are the problem.  At the end of a 
process of regulatory competition, the market-driven convergence could be codified in 
essential requirements in EC approximation.  This economic 'model' of regulatory competition 
can be shown to be of some but not great practical relevance in the EU (with respect, for 
example, to equivalence).  There is also little empirical evidence that intra-EC regulatory 
competition does take place (e.g. Neven, 1996). 
 
 Initial fears in the Community that regulatory competition would create a 'regulatory 
gap' (Bourgoignie, 1987, pp. 171-172) or a race to the bottom have not been borne out.  This 
is indeed what proper understanding of mutual recognition -- the prerequisite of regulatory 
competition -- would lead one to expect.  After all, mutual recognition only applies if the 
objectives or effects of regulations in different Member States are equivalent.  A race to the 
bottom, removing regulation justified by market failure would clearly violate the equivalence 
test.  Perhaps it may well work the other way, at times, as Vogel (1995, 1997) and Genschel 
and Pluemper (1997) attempt to show, namely pushing regulation 'upwards', especially in 
environment and food law.  This 'trading up' prompts the question whether it indicates a 
regulatory failure, ex-post, or a failure to tackle a market failure, ex ante.  If the political 
economy is not disciplined by regulatory quality requirements, there is a risk that regulatory 
failure may occur, that is, overregulation beyond what is needed to overcome the market 
failure. 
 
 A cost / benefit analysis of regulatory competition in the internal market is best made 
in comparison with that of EU regulation (here, approximation).  However, it is crucial, in 
such a comparison, to compare regulatory competition not with the 'old approach' (and easily 
declare victory) but with the new approach. 
 
 Exhibit 3 summarizes the main costs and benefits of EU regulation and of regulatory 
competition. (cf. Sun & Pelkmans, 1995). 
 
 The three benefits of regulatory competition are often mentioned and presumably 
require little elaboration. The third one, inspired by a Hayekian view of competition, is 
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difficult to evaluate. I would submit that its empirical significance is so unclear that it leads to 
extremely difficult policy dilemma's. Its appeal is perhaps more relative than absolute, that is, 
in cases where the costs of regulatory rigidity (e.g. product harmonisation before 1985 in the 
EU) are evidently very high, or where radical reform is going to prompt upheavals and far-
reaching adjustment anyway (e.g. EU telecoms before 1998), risky experiments and liberal 
processes of 'discovery' tend to become more acceptable. 
 
 
 Exhibit 3 
 
 EU regulation and regulatory competition: 
 costs and benefits 
 
       costs                 Benefits 
 
 regulatory competition 
 
1. open-ended and distortive 
 
2. sub-optimal regulation 
   (too little, or, too much) 
 
3. national regulatory drift 
1. greater choice of regulation 
2. 'disciplining effect' on national regulatory 
systems 
3. strategy for discovery, experimentation 
and innovation 
 
  
EU regulation* 
 
1. regulation disproportionate to market 
failure 
 
2. rigidity, once in place (esp. before EC-
92) 
1. removal of distortions, with (more) 
certainty for business 
2. flexibility (with EC-92), through various 
modes, intensities and differential scope 
  * here, approximation  
 
  
 The costs of regulatory competition may well be considerable. Sun & Pelkmans, op. 
cit., show by means of a detailed decomposition of the process in the EU as well as illustrative 
case-studies (one for goods, one for services) that regulatory competition may well be open-
ended and distortive. Also, the well-known argument tha t too little regulation may result, 
should not be dismissed, in contrast to the conclusions of Siebert & Koop (1990) and Oates & 
Schwab (1988). The point is that regulatory competition is not the same as fiscal competition 
where a 'race to the bottom' might never occur under 'fiscal equivalence'. Insufficient regula-
tion will allow the re-emergence of the market failure which regulation was originally 
designed to overcome. Similarly, too much regulation may occur as Peltzman (1976) has 
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shown 27). Finally, alteration of laws as a means of discovery has a price, quite apart from 
possible distortions, namely national regulatory drift. An extreme example is the drift in US 
state liability laws in the 1980s and early 1990s where hundreds of changes created great 
uncertainty, so much so that some markets failed or collapsed. 
 
 Shifting to the costs and benefits of EU regulation, it should first be noted that the 
picture here has changed quite radically since the mid-1980s. The relative attraction of 
regulatory competition has decreased since the new regulatory strategy of the EU has come to 
be accepted. The strategy has no doubt reduced the two types of costs in Exhibit 2: the highly 
detailed and otherwise excessive regulation, often disproportionate to the market failure (but 
pre-1985, under unanimity, inevitable for the free movement in such products), and the 
rigidity, once EC directives were in place 28). With minimum approximation, only of 
objectives ('essential requirements'), reference to voluntary standards 29) and options to 
comply even with the help of other standards, the dated anecdotes about the jam or chocolate 
directives or the hill- farming-tractor directive no longer form the benchmark to compare 
regulatory competition with. 
 
 On the benefit side, the first one (removal of distortions) has probably not changed in 
nature, yet drastically in scope. Beginning with the long delayed, proper implementation of 
the 1973 Low-Voltage directive in the early 1980s, EC-1992 has widened the range of 
products benefiting from free movement with often fairly 'light' and flexible directives 
enormously. This change was a function of the wide product scope of crucial EC-1992 
directives (e.g. toys, machines, electro-magnetic compatibility) and some horizontal ones (e.g. 
product liability), as well as the sheer number of industrial and agricultural product directives 
(some 160). Also, the flexibility of EU regulation has greatly improved, after the bitter and 
costly lessons from the past had been learned. In fact, a conscious differentiation has taken 
place amongst a wider range of partial or complete alternatives, such as a greater reliance on 
framework directives, sunset legislation, Council recommendations with a call for 
(constrained) self- regulation, etc. In regulations (unlike a directive, an EC regulation has 
direct effect throughout the Union and is, in that sense, 'centralist'), regional or national 
differentiation has also been introduced to a greater extent. 
 
 The most interesting aspect is perhaps that regulatory competition and EU regulation 
act as complements in all cases where SHEC objectives justify regulation. So, the upper and 
lower panels of Exhibit 3 are no longer independent in a large number of cases of products 
and services. To understand this, remember that, beyond the 'essential requirements' in EC 
directives, regulatory competition is allowed, if not implicitly encouraged. Unless a blocking 
minority insists on detailed specifications of 'essential requirements' (which has become rare, 
except in the environmental field), the threat of regulatory competition exercises a 
disciplinary effect on national regulators. Qualified majority voting and the no-frontiers 
accomplishment make this threat credible. This permanent discipline has been identified as a 
great strategic advantage in section 2. 
                                                 
    27 For e.g. US state regulation of registered nurses. However, these state rules were affecting inter-state free 
movement, which is not in keeping with the MR principle in the EU. Perhaps a comparable example consists of the 
packaging law in EU countries. 
    28 This rigidity was a result of the excessive detail in the directives, and the heavy procedural obstacles to non-
trivial changes (see Pelkmans, 1990, for elaboration). 
    29 And a widespread shift from design to performance standards 
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7. Business ‘  ambivalence  about mutual recognition 
 
 
It is well-known that business has a Janus-face when it comes to regulation and 
protectionism. Particular barriers protecting narrowly defined product markets may be 
strongly preferred by specific interests whilst, at the same time,  joining the overall lobbying 
against “overregulation”  and barriers in the internal market. In this sense one can almost 
never speak of one consistent business view.  Even when this caveat is taken into account, 
however,  it would seem entirely appropriate to call attention to the deep ambivalence 
business in Europe has developed about mutual recognition. With analogies of peeling an 
artichoke or sailing to the horizon on a big ocean, business expresses the sentiment that 
mutual recognition appears to be a promise which materializes in actual practice only very 
slowly. It is often suggested that MR has to be ‘conquered’, almost case by case, and is 
therefore not so radically different from approximation. Such utterances tend to be heavily 
biased towards the remaining problems since, where MR functions or approximation is 
satisfactory, nothing is heard. Given the practical difficulties of measuring the progress in 
applying the principle in so many submarkets in goods and services, the voices of frustrating 
are not put into perspective by a clear overall picture. Nevertheless, the problems business 
still encounters on a daily basis are simply too serious to be ignored or belittled. It is also 
narrow-minded, indeed   costly, to have a mythical confidence in the judicial and enforcement 
system of the EU as the sole source of removal of the many barriers as the Internal Market 
Scoreboards and a range of legal sources testify30. Much more cost-effective would seem to 
be the regular “package meetings “ the Commission holds with each one of the Member 
States where numerous instances of non-application of MR can be resolved. 
 
This section aims to illustrate the market realities of MR for business. After a few 
short examples from the Atkins report three cases in goods markets will be presented with a 
little more detail, followed by illustrations from the markets for business services. These 
illustrations help to understand the sharp contrast between the praise for an innovative 
principle and the scorn from business in Europe when entering markets.  
 
A few case studies from the Atkins (1998) report may give some impression what the 
uphill struggle means if one would insist on the right of free movement and market access. 
 
electric cables no formal barriers, but a private mutual recognition agreement 
between selected certification bodies having a ‘monopoly’ in 
each of the 16 member countries  (so, not the Global Approach 
for conformity assessment accompanying the ‘new approach’ of 
approximation, and presumably anti-competitive, the main 
motive being quality, but this could "raise rivals' costs" unduly); 
 
cement little cross-border trade because of regulatory and non-
regulatory barriers (hence, complex infringement cases, one by 
one) and a cartel severely limiting cross-border trade discovered 
in 1998; solutions to be found under the Construction Product 
Directive which moves very slow because of building codes 
                                                 
30 See for a survey and trends of infringements, other compliance problems and financial sanctions by the ECJ, 
Pelkmans . Gros & Nunez Ferrer, 2000, chapter   3 
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(etc.); it implies that MR is partly substituted by approximation 
and common standards. 
 
pesticides strong technical barriers; high costs of compliance; MR does not 
work and neither does approximation (in 1996/97).  MR here is 
legal fantasy.  The only reason that goods are not approximated 
is disagreement among Member States precisely about 'essential 
requirements'. 
 
carpets regulatory (fire-testing) and non-regulatory barriers; high 
compliance costs; MR does not work but embryonic private MR 
agreement now exists. 
 
 
 
             Zooming in on three other examples only confirms the complexity of MR application 
and helps one to appreciate the scepticism in business circles. All three are markets with 
considerable turnover and anything but marginal or exceptional. 
 
             The first case is “fortified food or drinks “31.  Typically these products claim to 
provide extra energy (e.g. for sports) or vitamins or otherwise be good for health. The central 
problem here is “non-equivalence” of objectives or effects  (mainly the latter) between 
Member States. So MR cannot work fully. Approximation had failed   at least up to 1998. The 
elegant triptich of the EU’s regulatory system (free movement through prohibitions to 
Member States; mutual recognition; approximation) breaks down and a seemingly chaotic 
battery of restrictions fragments the internal market. Non-equivalence is hard to tackle via the 
ECJ because the scientific evidence of  “effects” is unclear and in such cases the ECJ gives 
the benefits of the doubt to the country imposing restrictions.  The inconsistencies are many. 
Take margarine: whereas France applies a ban to fortification, it is compulsory in the 
Netherlands ! In many product categories there are labelling problems since the claims about 
health or other effects are often hard to substantiate; Member States differ in drawing the line 
between permissible claims and misleading ones. Parallel imports are usually not tightly 
controlled  - giving the impression that MR does work - but this can prompts liability claims. 
Yet another inconsistency is that some Member States employ positive lists and other ones 
negative lists.  
 
         Bicycles is a second case.32  Until recently the internal market for bicycles did not 
function properly. Unlike cars there is no technical approximation (neither ‘old’ approach like 
in cars nor ‘new’ approach) for bicycles. But MR was not allowed to work well either. The 
greatest problem is that national standards (which are, by definition, voluntary) in France and 
the UK have been referred to in domestic laws as compulsory. In Germany, with greater 
subtlety, exactly the same effect resulted because product liability insurance requires retailers 
to provide a ‘voluntary’ certificate of compliance with the DIN standard. The Danish 
concerns about theft go so far as to impose an obligation for an indelible mark/stamp for 
purposes of tracability. Since this creates problems for the import of painted bikes  (it is costly 
to paint separately on location of sales) it serves as a regulatory barrier and would be 
convicted by the ECJ. After several decades of growth, partly as a result of innovation 
(mountain bikes, etc.), demand is stagnating and the threat of import competition from the 
                                                 
31 Source: the Atkins (1998) report. 
32: The Internal Market Scoreboard no. 10, May 2002, pp. 21 – 23 
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East Asia has increased. In the second half of the 1990s the EU imposed anti-dumping duties. 
Some trade diversion was captured by EU producers behind these duties and a (high) tariff of 
15 %. It would seem that the mounting evidence of weak competitiveness of the Union’s 
bicycle industry and an awareness that some barriers might not be enforceable once tested 
before the ECJ  have finally prompted action, driven by the largest intra-EU exporter Italy. A 
consistent application of MR would lower cost for the industry and thereby enhance 
competitiveness. The approach taken is interesting. While avoiding approximation, mutual 
recognition will be based on the withdrawal of  national standards but only once a European 
(CEN) standard is agreed (which is expected). This standard is given legal force by publishing 
it under a general directive for safety which serves as a fall-back for instances where there is 
no product-specific directive.33  
 
          The third example is about the Danish beer fortress. In the internal market for beer MR 
might be believed to have prevailed ever since the famous 1987 case against Germany (and, 
little known, Greece as well). Not only is MR merely a necessary, yet far from sufficient 
condition to penetrate national beer markets (because of anti-competitive structures due to 
ownership or tied-finance-and-exclusive-distribution of beerhouses contracts as well as 
numerous anti-competitive conduct cases and problematic mergers), dubious restrictions have 
long remained in place which make a mockery of mutual recognition. The celebrated case is 
what can be denoted as the Danish beer fortress. Ever since Denmark became an EC Member 
State  (1973) several laws have been introduced creating cost-raising barriers for beer 
exporters from other Union countries. The Commission ‘s vigilance prevented these measures 
from taking effect or ensured their withdrawal. The measures were also seen as suspect 
because in those days Denmark had a tight duopoly of Tuborg and Carlsberg with a joint 
market share at home of over 90 %. The ingenious attempt to create a new regulatory barrier 
in 1981 proved harder to fight because it was tied up with an environmental cause: beer (and 
some other beverages) could only sold (hence, also imported) in reusable bottles, thereby 
blocking all canned beer imports and significantly raising costs for importers of bottled beers. 
It would go too far for the present illustration to enter the details of this case. The crux of the 
matter was whether environmental objectives could serve as a derogation of free movement 
(based on MR). But three circumstances spoke strongly against this: the clear protectionist 
intent (shown by this law being another attempt in a series), the fact that it was not least-
restrictive (violating proportionality) and, worst of all, shielding a tight domestic duopoly 
(soon to alter into a monopoly due to a merger). Also, the distortive effect was demonstrated 
when  the duopoly continued to produce huge exports of canned beer for the internal market 
while its competitors could not sell canned beer in their Danish home market. The  ECJ, in a 
stunning ruling, allowed the derogation in 1988  despite strong evidence in the Cecchini 
report (published five months before the ruling !) of the import blocking effect of the law.34  
The protectionist intent was moreover proven by the lifting of the law during a long strike at 
both Tuborg and Carlsberg in 1985/6 when imports dramatically increased, only to reduce to 
close to zero once the strike was over and the law restored. Was the environmental objective 
no longer valid during the strike ?  It was only in 2002 that Denmark finally agreed to accept 
imported beer not packaged in reusable bottles. This case shows clearly that MR requires 
extreme vigilance by the EU authorities and does not preclude clever instances of regulatory 
capture. 
 
 
                                                 
33 The General Safety directive 92/59   (Official Journal EC L 228 of  11 August 1992 , as amended   (see 
proposal in COM (2001) 63 of 2 Febr. 2001) 
34 See MAC (1988), esp. pp.  368 - 394 
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              Mutual recognition in services equally requires deep supervisory investment and 
vigilance. In the Commission’s view services “are much more prone to Internal Market 
barriers than goods and are harder hit”. 35  A compact but incomplete explanation is insightful:  
“ Because of the complex and intangible nature of services and the importance of the know-
how  and the qualifications of the service provider , the provision of services  is often subject 
to much more complex rules covering the entire service activity than is the case for goods. 
Furthermore, while some services can be provided at a distance, many still require the 
permanent or temporary presence of the service provider in the Member State where the 
service is delivered. Whereas with goods only the goods themselves are exported, in the case 
of service provision it is often the provider himself, his staff, his equipment and material that 
cross national borders. As a result some or all of the stages of the business process may take 
place in the Member State where the service is provided and be subject to requirements 
differing from those in the Member Sate of origin. This also means that barriers at a single 
stage of the business process cannot be looked at in isolation; their cumulative impact 
throughout the service activity must be considered”. (idem). Note that this worrying 
conclusion refers mainly to business services, the category at the bottom of Exhibit 2 where 
the application of MR should be expected to work. 
 
           The present paper is not the appropriate place to delve deeply into the maze of 
restrictions and the scope, actual or potential, for effective application of MR to business 
services. An arbitrary selection of examples might hammer home the point that much remains 
to be done to exploit MR. 36 At the same time it also means that the permanent welfare gains to 
be had from exposure to greater competitive pressure from cross-border origins should be 
quite significant. 
 
           Although monopolies are (now) rare in business services, all kinds of sweeping 
restrictions remain with analogous effects such as numerus-clausus rules for geographical 
areas, territorial restrictions   or even a single-establishment obligation (medical laboratories 
in a Member State) which implies the giving up of an establishment in the Member State of 
origin! Authorisations and registration requirements tend to be annoying, unnecessarily costly 
or next to prohibitive. Duplication (hence, going against the ECJ jurisprudence, see section 5),  
multiplicity (bakeries in one country tend to become a ‘collector’ of licences because licences 
do not refer to the nature of the business but to many individual products), long duration, too 
much discretion of the part of local authorities  and recommendations  from bodies made up 
of local competitors (!) are amongst these barriers and would appear to express the very 
opposite of a  “mutual recognition culture “ that the internal market for services requires. 
Because of the need to employ local establishment the very considerable fiscal problems of 
cross-border business, precisely for SMEs without professional fiscal departments, should not 
be underestimated.37 Similarly, because cross-border services by nature often involve 
temporary work across borders, the actual profitability of a contract is more often than not 
dependent on the extremely restrictive treatment of ‘posted workers ‘ where disproportionate 
requirements and duplication seem to be viewed as legitimate. If, in addition, companies 
make use of workers from employment agencies additional difficulties may arise.   
                                                 
35  Quoted from COM (2002) 441 of  30 July 2002, p. 6 
36 All examples taken from the paper quoted in footnote 35. 
37 See, for a detailed analysis, SEC (2001) 1681 of 23 October 2001, a special Annex on Company taxation  in 
the internal market, of  COM (2001) 582 on the strategy paper “Towards an internal market without obstacles” 
of the same date. 
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              Insofar as professional services are concerned, not only the cumbersome MR of 
diploma’s amounts to a severe obstacle but frequently a range of additional, often subtle 
barriers flowing from codes of conduct (self regulation of an anti-competitive nature) as well. 
               
              The consequences of these practices fall disproportionately on SMEs and on users 
who (rightly) take free movement serious. Practices are resistant to change because 
companies, especially SMEs shy away from litigation against local authorities. This leads to, 
what the Commission calls  “arrangement practices “   (not seldom with local competitors) or 
evasion  (“black market strategies “). It goes without saying that a lot of cross-border business 
simply gets discouraged by the number and arbitrariness of the barriers. 
 
              All the illustrations, even if selective, feed the ambivalence of business about mutual 
recognition. Much as they would like to compete across borders and deepen the economic 
meaning of the single market, firms find themselves unwillingly appointed as the guardian of 
the treaty (here, free movement under MR), chasing violations at their own costs. For business 
the legal access to national markets represents only one among several possible costs of 
gaining market share, besides different tastes, other marketing strategies and perhaps different 
pre- and after –sales service. Given the costs and uncertainties of MR in some goods and 
many services markets, the risks of testing MR are simply not assumed and what ought to be a 
single market remains too often fragmented. 
 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
Mutual recognition has taken root in EU law, policies, enforcement and, at least for 
goods, infrastructure. The introduction of mutual recognition has induced a focus on essential 
requirements, thereby reducing the intrusiveness of approximation or avoiding any EC 
directive altogether in thousands of cases. Indeed, as section 2 shows, the great strategic 
advantages of MR can be found in the systemic upheaval it prompted in the regulatory system 
of the EU. These strategic advantages are worth spelling out once again: a much more rapid 
realisation of the internal market, severe constraints to overregulation by Member States,  
additional disciplines on national regulators by the further option of regulatory competition 
and a search for  “best practice”  regulation among Member States, whether for national 
purposes or for directives. In addition, the direct ‘welfare’ benefits are likely to be 
considerable as MR is pro-competitive, without sacrificing essential regulatory objectives 
such as health, safety, environment and consumer protection. Only when quality is extremely 
demanding, a risk might exist that the needed investment in reputation is so costly that entry 
barriers are even strengthened in the internal market. The conclusion is that mutual 
recognition is highly beneficial and many of the gains are permanent. 
 
However, the application of MR in the internal market for goods and services is not an 
unambiguous success story. Applying the principle turns out to have fairly high information, 
transaction and compliance costs. We identify six cost elements including, among other 
things, the abstract nature of MR when inspectors or indeed business itself are confronted 
with well-specified national law which might be overridden by this ‘invisible’ notion, the 
absence of a ‘rule book’ for MR for market participants, the lack of clarity about the ‘effects’ 
(much more than ‘objectives’), the very high costs of monitoring, the low speed of EC judicial 
review (which invites strategic or opportunistic behaviour) and the increasing complications 
in MR interpretation, especially in services. Focussing on existing barriers, lowering these 
costs has not been aggressively pursued by the EU until very recently. When it comes to the 
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prevention of new regulatory barriers, the picture in goods is completely different: for already 
18 years and with increasing effectiveness a low-key committee stops Member States from 
further fragmenting the internal market.  This highly valuable piece of infrastructure does not 
exist for services.  
 
Mutual recognition covers about half of intra-EC industrial trade, but it only matters 
for the 30 % of intra-EC trade for which national regulations exist. A selection of examples, 
some of which with considerable detail, illustrates the practical problems for business when 
relying on the MR principle. Business in Europe is disenchanted about MR as it works out in 
actual practice. Firms find themselves unwillingly appointed as the guardian, or at least 
frontsoldiers, of the treaty, chasing violations at their own costs. Although hard overall figures 
are not available, the situation in services is probably graver. As Exhibit 2 clarifies, there are 
many tradeable services where MR is pointless or of very limited significance. In financial 
and business services it applies but leaves much to be desired for reasons of information, 
compliance and the crucial meaning of a link with FDI in services. In road transport MR 
works well and is exploited dynamically. The analysis also explores the role regulatory 
competition could play, as a dynamic complement to MR. Compared with the ‘new approach’ 
expectations should not be set high because regulatory competition may well be distortive and 
because in actual practice it cannot fully substitute for approximation (due to the lack of 
‘equivalence’). 
 
The manifold benefits of MR for Europe are too great to allow the present ambiguities 
to continue. The EU needs much more pro-active approaches as proposed in recent 
Commission documents and should create permanent monitoring infrastructures for MR in 
services. Above all, what is required can be called the development of a “ mutual recognition 
culture”. Such a culture would have to improve and deepen the triptich of information-
confidence-Union mindset for national policy-makers and compliance officers. It is in that 
spirit that the new Commission and other initiatives should be assessed so that the Union can 
better enjoy the fruits of its own regulatory ingenuity. 
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